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This paper develops a theoretical framework for the integration of information systems (IS) after a merger or an
acquisition. The framework integrates three perspectives: a structuralist, an individualist, and an interactive process
perspective to analyze and understand such integrations. The framework is applied to a longitudinal case study of a
manufacturing company that grew through an acquisition. The management decided to integrate the production
control IS via tailoring a new system that blends together features of existing IS. The application of the framework in
the case study confirms several known impediments to IS integrations. It also identifies a number of new inhibitors,
as well as known and new facilitators that can bring post-merger IS integration to a success. Our findings provide
relevant insights to researching and managing post-merger IS integrations. They emphasize that researchers and
managers of post-merger IS integration should pay particular attention to the IS and organizational merger contexts;
the need to build relationships and collaboration between the merging parties; power struggles; and, perhaps most
importantly, understanding and treating post-merger IS integration as a complex, messy, and evolutionary process.
Keywords: mergers & acquisitions (M&A), post-merger information systems (IS) integration, post-acquisition
integration, case study

Volume 13, Issue 1, pp. 5-30, March 2012
Tuure Tuunanen acted as the Senior Editor for this paper.

Volume 13

Issue 1

Article 2

A Framework for Understanding Post-Merger Information
Systems Integration
INTRODUCTION
1

Mergers and acquisitions (M&As) are a prominent tool for corporate strategy, with the worldwide value of deals
exceeding USD 2,400 billion in 2010 (Reuters 2011). As a result, thousands of firms face the challenges of postmerger integration, defined as “blending together of organizational components” (Shrivastava 1986; Mehta and
Hirschheim 2007). Such integration is often problematic, and faulty integration is a significant cause of merger
failures (Shrivastava 1986; Haspeslagh and Jemison 1991; Habeck, Kröger et al. 2000).
Information systems (IS) integration is noted as one of the crucial issues in overall organizational integration and,
ultimately, for the success of the merger (I/S-Analyzer 1989; Merali and McKiernan 1993; McKiernan and Merali
1995; Weber and Pliskin 1996; Chin, Brown et al. 2004; Wijnhoven, Spil et al. 2006; Mehta and Hirschheim 2007).
Consider the following real-life instance:
On March 4 2007, 500 US Airlines passengers missed their flights at Charlotte-Douglas International Airport
and altogether thousands of US Airways passengers suffered long delays. Some passengers claimed they
had not been able to speak to a ticket agent after waiting for more than two hours. This happened because
of a problem with the reservation system and the fact that the automated kiosks did not work. The
underlying reason was that on the same day, the airline was trying to combine the reservation systems of
US Airways and America West, two years after their merger in 2005.
Post-gazette.com (March 5, 2007)
This example illustrates the importance of post-merger IS integration in practice and how problems in IS integration
may result in delays, lost opportunities, decreased revenues (cf. Stylianou, Jeffries, and Robbins 1996) or huge
capital costs (Merali and McKiernan 1993). Remarkable counter-synergies can be hidden in information systems
(Robbins and Stylianou 1999).
The merger situation poses special challenges for IS integration. It is affected by organizational differences (Weber
and Pliskin 1996), and, during such restructuring, value sets are altered and power is redistributed. These make IS
integrations in mergers fertile ground for employee resistance (Haspeslagh and Jemison 1991), cultural clashes
(Weber and Pliskin 1996), and power struggles (Metha and Hirschheim 2007). These problems are aggravated by
the fact that, instead of having to deal with one set of various stakeholders and intra-organizational subcultures, the
decision-makers need to manage at least as many of these problems as there are merging organizations.
Furthermore, the impact of information systems may be overlooked in the merger planning phase (Buck–Lew,
Wardle, and Pliskin 1992; Stylianou, Jeffries, and Robbins 1996), or the implications of their integration may not be
fully considered (McKiernan and Merali 1995). IS personnel are often excluded from pre-merger negotiations

CONTRIBUTION
This article makes three contributions to IS research and practice. It presents the first comprehensive literature review on post-merger IS
integration and thus provides a thorough description of the state-of-art in this under-researched area of IS research, on which other IS
researchers can build their work. Second, it integrates the outcome of the literature study with an existing framework of IS innovation. The
resulting framework can be used to examine, understand, plan, and prepare post-merger IS integrations. The framework goes beyond the
conventional approaches to IS integration, which stress the importance of structural issues in post-merger IS integration by supplementing it
with a focus on the characteristics and actions of the involved individual actors and stakeholders and by emphasizing the interaction
between structure and individuals in a complex social process which unfolds over time. The third contribution is the particular process
perspective, which in itself is quite rare in post-merger IS integration research. It is demonstrated in an in-depth case study, which provides a
rich empirical account and analysis of an actual post-merger IS integration venture, which although initially plagued by problems, overcame
these challenges, recovered, and came to a successful conclusion. Beyond confirming existing obstacles and facilitators, the case study
uncovered barriers and mediators that are new and so far undocumented in post-merger IS-integration research. The case description can
thus serve as an inspiration for future post-merger IS integration projects.

1

In the literature on mergers and acquisitions, the use of the term merger is frequently used to refer to both activities: the merger of equals, and
the merger by acquisition in which both parties are not-equal in terms of their size and power. Sometimes the terms are used interchangeably
(Granlund 2003; Mehta and Hirschheim 2007; Wijnhoven et al. 2006). Similarly, this paper will also use the terms merger and post-merger to
cover both mergers and acquisitions. The terms acquisition and post-acquisition are used to emphasize the power differences of the “acquirer”
and “acquired” parties. The acquired party may be an entire company or a smaller asset (Wijnhoven, Spil et al. 2006), such as the acquired
production plant in the case.
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(Calabrese 1991; Mehta and Hirschheim 2007). However, after a deal has been closed, IS personnel are expected
to reconcile the different systems quickly (McKiernan and Merali 1995; Wijnhoven, Spil, Stegwee and Fa 2006),
even if they have not had enough time for planning and preparation (Calabrese 1991).
Our review of the literature will show that scholarly literature on post-merger IS integration is scarce. As a
consequence, only a limited understanding of the post-merger IS integration process exists. This paper aims to
improve this understanding. Accordingly, our research questions are: Who and what influences the post-acquisition
IS integration process, and how is post-acquisition IS integration shaped?
The empirical data presented here portrays the case of a printing company that acquired a plant from a competitor.
The printing company (now known as PrintComp) decided to integrate the IS after adopting a tailored, new system
that blended together features of existing systems. In this case, many known and some new inhibitors of success
were present, and yet the organization was eventually able to meet its goals for the post-acquisition IS integration
project.
The paper is organized as follows. In the following section, we present the theoretical framework for our study. Our
framework is based on a literature review of existing knowledge on post-merger IS integration and an analytical
framework to extend the understanding of post-acquisition IS integration. In the third section, a longitudinal case
study, as well as our data collection and data analysis approaches are described. The next section describes the
case setting, followed by our case analysis. Finally, we present our findings and implications for theory and practice.

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
The range of post-merger IS integration options varies from maintaining the status quo over different types of partial
integration (e.g., front-end or back-end integration only) to full integration (Giacomazzi et al. 1997). Prior research on
post-merger IS integration has reported on a range of implemented strategies, including tailoring a new IS (e.g.,
Jelassi and Dutta 1993), acquiring a new ERP solution (e.g., Alaranta and Henningsson 2008), adopting acquirer’s
IS (e.g., Mehta and Hirschheim 2007; Alaranta and Henningsson 2008), picking and mixing the best applications
(e.g., Mehta and Hirschheim 2007). Also, outsourcing IS, Enterprise Application Integration (EAI), and building
“bridge-ware” are among possible strategies, as well as mixing these approaches.
Our empirical study concerns a case where a full integration was achieved by tailoring a new IS that blends together
2
features of existing IS, and this perspective guided our literature review.

Literature Review
To position our work, we initially conducted a systematic search for articles on post-merger IS integration. (See
Appendix B for more details on the selection of outlets and the performed search, as well as a summary of articles
found and their key findings.) Overall, the existing literature is scarce and fragmented.
For example, the focus of existing publications are on post-merger IS planning, the role of IT fit in merger, IS
integration effectiveness on mergers, success factors of post-merger IS integration, factors influencing strategic
decision-making for post-merger IS integration, antecedents for effective post-merger IS integration, knowledgesharing in post-merger IS integration, business/IS alignment in post-merger IS integration, and the effect of postmerger IS integration capability on merger performance. Much of this literature can be described as factor research
(examples include Stylianou, Jeffries, and Robbins 1996; Giacomazzi, Panella, Pernici, and Sansoni 1997; Robbins
and Stylianou 1999). No research providing a detailed, longitudinal account of a post-merger IS integration was
found. Existing literature provides explanations of post-merger IS integration, which supplement each other, but are
based on different perspectives and are focused on different phases of the post-merger IS integration process. The
literature illustrates that post-merger IS integration is a multifaceted, idiosyncratic, and complex phenomenon.
Our literature review shows that one strong emphasis lies on the structural issues of the post-merger IS integration
(see Main and Short 1989; Merali and McKiernan 1993; McKiernan and Merali 1995; Johnston and Yetton 1996;
Weber and Pliskin 1996; Giacomazzi, Panella, Pernici, and Sansoni 1997; Stylianou, Jeffries, and Robbins 1996;
Robbins and Stylianou 1999; Wijnhoven, Spil, Stegwee, and Fa 2006). Other research shows that individual
managerial skills and action are important determinants of post-merger IS integration success (Stylianou, Jeffries,
and Robbins 1996; Robbins and Stylianou 1999). However, the broad range of individual actions has not been
studied in depth.
2

This paper uses the term post-M&A IS integration to indicate “blending together of organizational components,” following the post-M&A IS
integration literature (Shrivastava 1986; Mehta and Hirschheim 2007). Enterprise Application Integration (EAI) and bridge-ware are among the
options for post-M&A IS integration, but strategies for post-M&A IS are not limited to these.
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Some studies (Granlund 2003; Wijnhoven, Spil, Stegwee, and Fa 2006) have taken a process perspective. Granlund
(2003) concludes that contingency factors alone do not offer a sufficient explanation for the evolution of
management accounting systems following a merger. He finds that in post-merger IS integration, structure and
action are inseparable and hence form an interactive process, which is entrenched in the context and shaped by the
history of the merger and the affected information systems (Haspeslagh and Jemison 1991, Granlund 2003,
Alaranta and Henningsson 2008). This view is supported by Vieru and Rivard (2008) who suggest that ISs evolve
through a process of knowledge sharing after a merger. (See Table 9 in Appendix B for a summary of the literature
review.)
In these studies, either structural issues, individual managerial actions, or the process perspective are used as
largely independent explanatory tools. But there is no work that combines all three perspectives.

The Analytical Framework
The three identified research streams in the existing post-merger IS integration literature serve as a frame for the
development of our theoretical approach to understand and analyze the integration process in our case study. The
framework’s three perspectives, labeled the structuralist, the individualist, and the interactive process perspective,
have earlier also been described and used by Slappendel (1996) to analyze research on innovations in
organizations.
The combination of the three perspectives has shown to be a fruitful avenue for empirical research of other ISrelated organizational changes (e.g., emergence of IS development methods and software process improvement
innovations [Kautz 2004; Kautz and Nielsen 2004; Madsen, Kautz, and Vidgen 2006]). Our preliminary analysis of
the PrintComp’s IS integration case revealed that the combination of these perspectives is powerful in explaining
integration. The focus of this research is to transfer and extend Slappendel’s (1996) framework to post-merger IS
integration. The paper argues that combining the three perspectives in an integrative framework allows for a more
holistic understanding of post-merger IS integration. The framework also has some general relevance for IS
research, as it addresses the relation between structure and agency (Giddens 1997; Rose, Jones, and Truex 2005).
To identify structural, individual, and process elements and to integrate them in a comprehensive framework, we
now review the literature on post-merger IS integration.
The Structuralist Perspective
This perspective sheds light on how various structural characteristics influence and shape post-merger IS
integration. The acquisition context as a structural element is characterized by issues such as the selected IS
integration strategy, the distribution of decision making in the IS integration process, the IS/business alignment in the
merger and related organizational changes, and the role of the IS in the merger (Merali and McKiernan 1993;
McKiernan and Merali 1995; Stylianou, Jeffries, and Robbins 1996; Robbins and Stylianou 1999; Granlund 2003;
Wijnhoven, Spil, Stegwee, and Fa 2006; Mehta and Hirschheim 2007; Vieru and Rivard 2008).
The structural characteristics of the existing IS affect post-merger IS integration (Mehta and Hirschheim 2007), and
so do the those of the new―desired―IS, such as its complexity. Complexity affects the integration, depending on
the magnitude of the change required (Mehta and Hirschheim 2007; Wijnhoven, Spil, Stegwee, and Fa 2006).
Finally, the qualities of the IS integration team as a structural element impact the post-merger IS integration (Yelassi
and Dutta 1993).
The aforementioned concepts allow for an understanding of how structural characteristics affect the post-merger IS
integration. However, the emphasis is on fixed and static descriptions. The structuralist perspective does not
address the impact of individuals, their characteristics, or their actions; nor does it account for the interaction
between structure and action over time.
The Individualist Perspective
The characteristics and actions of individual stakeholders influence and shape the post-acquisition IS integration
process. Previous studies emphasize the relevance of this perspective, inasmuch as individual managers have a
strong influence on integration outcomes (Robbins and Stylianou 1999). Granlund (2003) reported from a postmerger integration where the role of dominant individuals was evident. Furthermore, the different human actors’
understanding of each other’s practices in a merger IS integration endeavor is reflected in the features of the
integrated IS (Vieru and Rivard 2008).
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Top management’s commitment and support (Main and Short 1989; Robbins and Stylianou 1999) affect post-merger
IS integration. Beyond top management, the literature on post-merger IS integration also identifies several other
stakeholders. These stakeholders include the IS integration project manager, the IS integration team, IS staff, and
users (I/S-Analyzer 1989; Main and Short 1989; Merali and McKiernan 1993; McKiernan and Merali 1995; Stylianou,
Jeffries, and Robbins 1996), as well as possible external consultants (Jelassi and Dutta 1993).
Prior post-merger IS integration experience (I/S-Analyzer 1989; Stylianou, Jeffries, and Robbins 1996) helps IS
integration managers to develop skills that influence their actions when managing the integration through planning,
devoting sufficient resources, or when resolving conflicts and dealing with resistance or other problems (I/S-Analyzer
1989; Merali and McKiernan 1993; McKiernan and Merali 1995; Stylianou, Jeffries, and Robbins 1996; Giacomazzi,
Panella, Pernici, and Sansoni 1997; Granlund 2003). Project teams and external consultants also need to possess
sufficient experience and skills to deal with both business and technical aspects of the IS integration (Jelassi and
Dutta 1993).
The communication preferences of the involved individuals, together with their communication skills and willingness
to communicate with end users and other stakeholder groups has frequently been mentioned as an important issue
in post-merger IS integration (McKiernan and Merali 1995; Robbins and Stylianou 1999). Communication
preferences include clarifying both the need for change and the shared vision (Jelassi and Dutta 1993).
Finally, the users’ skills to utilize the new system, their attitude, possible resistance to change, are relevant issues in
post-merger IS integration (Jelassi and Dutta 1993).
These concepts allow for an in-depth understanding of the individuals responsible for and involved in the postmerger IS integration and their influence on the process. But the concepts identified do not focus on the postacquisition IS integration as a change process.
The Interactive Process Perspective
The interactive process perspective emphasizes that the post-merger IS integration is a process that evolves over
time (Merali and McKiernan 1993; McKiernan and Merali 1995; Johnston and Yetton 1996; Granlund 2003; Chin,
Brown, and Hu 2004; Wijnhoven, Spil, Stegwee, and Fa 2006), where structure and action are inseparable
(Granlund 2003).
Post-merger IS integration progresses through the interaction between structural influences and the skills and
actions of individuals and the content of change. That is, the IS has to be integrated. The final product may have
functionalities different from those in the original design as the IS is continuously defined and its properties change
during the integration process (Vieru and Rivard 2008).
As human actors are involved, the IS integration process takes place in a social context as a social process. The
social context of the IS integration process is affected by a number of issues such as IS resource utilization, the role
of IS as a tool for restructuring and integration, improved IS capability during the integration process, the new IS’s
level of innovation, its impact on business, and the extent to which the outcome of the IS integration project and the
integrated system depends on external issues as well as possible technical difficulties (I/S-Analyzer 1989; Merali
and McKiernan 1993; McKiernan and Merali 1995; Stylianou, Jeffries, and Robbins 1996; Robbins and Stylianou
1999; Granlund 2003; Mehta and Hirschheim 2007). Relevant issues in the social context may also include the
involved stakeholders’ capabilities to exploit merger opportunities (Robbins and Stylianou 1999), as well as changes
in the integration objectives and integration strategy and schedule delays (Granlund 2003), or changing user needs
(Jelassi and Dutta 1993). Other aspects of the social context may concern unintended consequences of the IS
integration, such as the disruption of business operations or different user satisfaction with the IS integration
(Robbins and Stylianou 1999).
The focus in the interactive process perspective lies in those elements of the social context which make up the
social relations among the participants of the IS integration project; their social infrastructure; history of the IS
integration, including previous integration projects, as well as previous procedures, structures, and commitments
(Haspeslagh and Jemison 1991, Granlund 2003, Alaranta and Henningsson 2008, Vieru and Rivard 2008) which
shape the post-merger IS integration process.
Cultural and political aspects characterize the social process of post-merger IS integration. Several studies (I/SAnalyzer 1989; Weber and Pliskin 1996; Granlund 2003; Chin, Brown, and Hu 2004) have found that organizational
culture and conflict affect post-merger IS integration, as do political and power structure issues (Merali and
McKiernan 1993; McKiernan and Merali 1995; Granlund 2003; Mehta and Hirschheim 2007). A lack of common
language adds to these problems (Granlund 2003).
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In summary, the interactive process perspective builds on and complements the structural and individualist
perspectives. The three perspectives form a comprehensive and coherent analytical approach that will be used to
organize, describe, and analyze the data from the post-acquisition IS integration in the case company. Table 1
summarizes the three perspectives and their key components.
Table 1: The Analytical Framework
Perspective
Structuralist
(Structural
characteristics)
Individualist
(Individual
characteristics and
action)
Interactive Process
(Structure, action, and
their interaction over
time)

Key Components
Acquisition context; existing information systems; new, desired information
systems; and IS integration team
• Characteristics hereof influence and shape the post-merger IS integration.
Top management commitment; prior post-acquisition IS integration experience;
post-acquisition IS integration skill; communication preferences, resistance to
change
• Influence the individuals’ actions, which in turn influence the post-merger IS
integration
Content of change―the planned and the actual post-merger IS integration process
emerge in interaction with the social context and social process.
Social context―social relations, infrastructure, and the history of previous
procedures, structures, and commitments influence and shape the post-merger
IS integration.
Social process―cultural, political, and power aspects of the merging organizations
and IS departments influence the post-merger IS integration.

RESEARCH APPROACH
We opted for a longitudinal qualitative case study, as it allows for a detailed in-depth scrutiny of post-merger IS
integration in its real-life settings (Yin 1984; Eisenhardt 1989). Such a qualitative method facilitates the examination
of the case from the three analytical perspectives chosen for this study at the desired level of detail.

Case PrintComp
The empirical data for this paper was collected from the post-acquisition IS integration at PrintComp, a European
printing company, which produces magazines and glossy brochures. The chosen case is interesting (1) because it
presents a process of fully integrating the different IS after an acquisition, and (2) because the organization blended
features of existing ISs to a tailor-made new system. Such a case allows for a detailed observation of a vast array of
issues in an IS integration process. We also had broad access to information over time from multiple organizational
levels, and the external IS vendor.
PrintComp assumed its current form in 1999 when it acquired a printing plant (plant P1) from a competitor. Prior to
the acquisition, PrintComp already owned plant P2, its primary production site, and three more plants, which we call
P3, P4, and P5. While the plants P2–P5 were located in the area of one city (in the following referred to as the
Historical city), P1 was located in another city, the Capital city (also a pseudonym).
During the period 1999–2002, PrintComp had tried to integrate its production capacity several times, but these
attempts had failed because of employee resistance. For that time period, the geographically separated plants of the
organization shared only a common brand name, the top management team, and some high-level financial
reporting. But, in their daily operations, they maintained their pre-merger processes, procedures, and organizational
cultures.
In 2002, management decided to integrate the ISs in the different plants to finally integrate the production processes
across plants and to enable better financial reporting. For this purpose, a new integrated production control IS was
developed by an external vendor. However, the IS integration process was complex and troublesome, and different
problems were reported from the various plants.
The purpose of the new, integrated IS was to allow coordination of production between plants as well as better
financial reporting and control. The new IS blended the business logic of the old IS at plant P1 and the user interface
of the old IS at plant P2. The new IS consisted of modules and applications for sales, manufacturing, inventory, and
supply, as well as cost accounting and financial reporting for the company’s specific production process. These
applications are typical for ERP systems, and for this reason, both the vendor and PrintComp called the IS
PrintComp’s new ERP. The integrated IS also comprised new functionality to coordinate production between plants.
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Accounting functions, such as accounts receivable and payable, asset accounting, book-keeping, as well as human
resource management applications, were not intended to be in production in the local plants because PrintComp
administered these applications centrally.

Data Collection
We followed the case organization over a period of thirty months, and our research covers a time span of nearly six
years after the merger of the IS integration process. We gathered data from the case via semi-structured interviews
and through internal documents. The interviewees were selected to cover the various roles and management levels
involved in the studied IS integration process. The roles included representatives of top management, the integration
project manager, user support, users at different levels, and the software vendor. The initial list of informants was
composed in cooperation with the integration project manager, and more interviewees were added, based on
insights and suggestions gained in the interviews. Multiple interviews and a few informal discussions were
conducted with some key interviewees such as the integration project manager.
The interviews were conducted by the first author in three interview rounds in 2003, 2004, and 2005. The interviews
lasted between one and one-and-a-half hours. In 2003 and 2004, extensive notes were taken during the interviews,
and in 2005, when more trust was established, interviews were tape-recorded and transcribed.
The interview themes were organized along the timeline of the IS integration from designing the IS integration
strategy to the execution of the IS integration. For each phase, problems, strengths, and success and failure issues
were discussed. The actual interview themes were refined for each interviewee to match their expertise and adapted
to capture the topics that emerged during the interviews. Examples of the interview questions are presented in
Appendix A.
The data collected via interviews were complemented with the case company’s internal reports to gain a broad view
of the phenomenon in question (Yin 1984; Eisenhardt 1989). The report contained, among other things, the
company’s yearly internal surveys of end-users’ views on the new IS. Table 2 contains both a timeline of the postacquisition IS integration project and a summary of the data collection process.

Data Analysis
Our understanding of post-merger IS integration came about through an iterative process of interpretation,
comparison, and intertwining of prior research with empirical data. Data collection that took place over a three-year
period was carried out in an exploratory manner, yet was informed by the concepts provided by the existing
literature. Both new research results published after the start of this study and suitable theoretical frameworks for
understanding the complexities of post-merger IS integration were sought throughout the process of carrying out the
study.
The development of the analytical framework was informed by the knowledge gained during the process. A contextbased and process-oriented description of the phenomenon which was produced by the first author and which
acknowledges the interviewed individuals as actors, and the framework to provide valid explanations laid the
groundwork for the interpretive epistemological and ontological orientation of our research.
The interview and other data were analyzed with the help of NVivo software. The concepts in the analytical
framework were used as nodes for coding the empirical data. We organized the data according to our framework’s
categories, due to the iterative nature of this study; that is, our growing knowledge concerning the case, together
with the previous literature on post-merger IS integration, had informed the crafting of the concepts. On occasions
where the data did not match these categories, the observations were coded as free nodes and received specific
attention in the subsequent analysis. One example of this was the identification of the simultaneous changes in the
ways of doing printing business that took place during the post-merger IS integration. This influence was
conceptualized as a structural component, which was not identified in the earlier literature.
Third, constant comparison across data sources (multiple informants) and across data collection methods
(interviews and internal reports), as well as the constant search for contrasts, negative evidence, and unexpected
findings were used to further strengthen our interpretation. (See APPENDIX C for an example of constant
comparison.)
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Table 2: The Post-acquisition IS Integration Project Timeline and the Data Collection Process
Project timeline

Time of
data
collection

1999
• PrintComp buys a plant, plant P1,
from its competitor
1999–2002
• Failed attempts to integrate production
in all plants
• Decision to develop and implement a
new IS in plant P1
• Decision to extend the new IS to a
company-wide ERP-like IS to achieve
integration of production process and
IS
• Development of a new, integrated IS
Jan. 1, 2003
• Implementation of the new, integrated
IS in plant P1as pilot site

Data collected

(covered post-hoc in interviews; see below)

(covered post-hoc in interviews; see below)

April 2003

Jan. 1, 2004
• Implementation of the new, integrated
IS in 3 other plants (P2, P3, P4)

May 2004

Jan. 1, 2005
• Implementation of the new, integrated
IS in the last plant P5 and follow-up

May–June
2005

• 11 interviewees: Implementation Project
Manager, CFO, Information Systems Designer,
Customer Service Manager, 2 Plant Managers, 2
Controllers, 2 Customer Service Clerks, Project
Manager of the software vendor
• Documents: end-user survey, brochures, project
plans, financial data
• 6 interviewees: Implementation Project Manager,
CFO, Information Systems Designer, Controller,
Customer Service Manager, System support
• Documents: end-user survey, employee
journals, financial data
• 7 interviewees: Implementation Project Manager,
CFO, Controller, Chief Production Officer,
Project Manager of the software vendor,
Programmers of the software vendor
• Documents: end-user survey, employee
journals, financial data

CASE SETTING: POST-ACQUISITION IS INTEGRATION IN PRINTCOMP
PrintComp, a European print house, which produces periodicals and promotional materials, acquired a production
plant (plant P1) from a competitor. It chose to pursue a full IS integration to improve control of the production
process, to better coordinate its overall production capacity, and to enable better financial reporting. In the following,
we provide a brief history of the IS integration project from before its inception in 1999 up to its official close in 2005.
After acquiring P1, PrintComp’s production grew substantially, and its profitability has continued to be satisfactory.
However, the IS integration process was difficult, and various problems occurred in different plants. The way the
printing business operated changed dramatically during the integration project, with the unforeseen introduction of
mass-customization in digital printing. In addition, a key customer changed its operations mode, posing new
requirements for PrintComp’s information system.
In 1998, PrintComp employed approximately 300 people in its existing plants. At the same time, the number of
personnel at plant P1 numbered around 230. The plants PrintComp owned prior to the acquisition of P1 were
organized on a functional basis. They operated with an integrated, tailor-made IS, an ERP-like system that imposed
a great deal of control on the production process. Production at plant P1 was organized in terms of processes
focused on customer service. Plant P1 also used a tailor-made IS, allowing for flexibility based on specific customer
demands.
In 1999, PrintComp acquired plant P1, at which point the company’s management concluded that P1 had the more
efficient production processes and decided to implement those processes in the other plants, too. At this time, the
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plan did not include integrating IS. However, PrintComp’s production function asked for IS integration as soon as the
acquisition decision had been made. These attempts, ongoing from 1999 throughout 2002, proved unsuccessful.
Since plant P1’s previous owner had not included the continued use of its IS in the deal, PrintComp decided to first
develop a tailored IS to run P1 alone and appointed a project manager in 1999. A deal was made with a domestic
vendor to deliver a new IS within three years. The requirements for the new information system for P1 were defined
in 1999. The system was to be based on the business logic of P1’s former IS and on the user interface of the IS
running at PrintComp’s primary production site, plant P2.
In early 2000, management concluded that a tailored integrated IS would bring strategic competitive advantage and
decided to extend the new IS’s scope to the rest of the company. An IS integration team was set up. The team
consisted of a project leader who was later promoted to IS integration project manager, two support staff, and four to
five functional groups consisting of key staff from the different plants to provide requirements for the new IS. The
project also had a steering committee consisting of the project manager and four to five senior managers.
In January 2003, PrintComp started to implement the new system in P1 as the pilot site. At this time, the functional
groups and the steering committee were dissolved. Utilization of the integrated IS commenced at plant P1 in 2003
with a test period, which was due to end four months after implementation. But the users were frustrated.
Implementation at the pilot site proved difficult, as the IS was inaccurate, flawed, and full of code bugs. Due to the
poor quality of the system, some functionality had to be tuned and reprogrammed, leaving the test period unfinished
according to the plan. Conflicts of interest with the vendor became apparent; nevertheless, the user operators at P1
used the system.
In 2004, the new IS was implemented in three more plants. It included functionality to coordinate production between
plants. Implementation at plant P5 had to be delayed, due to insufficient quality of some critical software modules
designed for use in P5 alone. Despite the IS still being plagued with bugs, it was up and running, it supported
operations, and it produced tangible benefits such as better control and coordination. Users, however, were
dissatisfied at all plants. Users at plants P2–P4 found it hard to simultaneously change their work processes and
start using the new IS. They felt that the IS which had been developed for P1 and the accompanying work processes
had been imposed on them.
By 2005, the integrated IS was finally in use at all five plants, and a newly performed user satisfaction survey
showed that satisfaction had widely improved. The IS integration project was officially closed at the end of 2005.

ANALYSIS OF THE POST-ACQUISITION IS INTEGRATION PROCESS
We now present a detailed analysis of PrintComp’s IS integration, emphasizing different aspects of the case
according to the structuralist, individualist, and interactive process perspectives.

The Structuralist Perspective
The acquisition context was characterized by PrintComp’s intention to prevent over-capacity in the market by
acquiring plant P1 from a competitor. Synergies in production were also sought. However, several attempts to
integrate production―without integrating IS―failed. Given this background, top management decided to use full IS
integration as an enabler to achieve the desired production synergies.
This strategy secured an initial alignment of business and IS. However, the managerial perspective on coordination
and control was rather general and resulted in only vague requirements for the new IS. In addition, the business
environment changed simultaneously due to, among other things, the introduction of mass customization of print
products. Together, this resulted in a development process where requirements were changing continuously. As a
consequence, the new IS initially had a modest quality, some of its functions had to be refined, and the IS as a
whole underwent frequent alterations.
The old ISs in the different plants were tailor made and represented different ways of operation, but they were not
appropriate for the new mode of operation. Yet, they had some strengths, both with regard to business logic and
process efficiency, and with regard to process control and the user interface.
Plant P1 needed a new IS sooner because its IT infrastructure was not part of the acquisition deal. As no updates of
the existing IS in the other plants were available, a combined, tailored solution to cater to the peculiarities of
PrintComp’s integrated business was developed. The vision was to blend together P1’s IS business logic and the
other plants’ process control and user interface.
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This new IS was initially disliked by all parties. As plant P1’s business logic was chosen and P1 had an urgent need
to get a new IS, the representatives from this factory received a privileged role in the IS requirements definition. This
resulted in the other plants’ employees appreciating the IS even less. The situation was aggravated by the fact that
the IS contained many errors and was frequently changed.
This can be explained by the structural characteristics of the IS integration team. At the outset, the IS integration
team represented a broad range of necessary roles and resources. However, the core project team had no time for
several critical tasks. The most important was testing the new IS thoroughly, and thus partly erroneous software was
initially installed. As the official functional groups were disbanded soon after the original requirements were defined,
their views were not represented properly in the course of the project. The small IS project team was then solely
responsible for the requirements gathering and their realization. The team could not make up for this omission,
although the functional groups’ members continued to cooperate with the project team informally. In addition, the
steering committee had already been dissolved prior to the first installation of the new IS, thereby losing the
resources for long-term strategic planning.
The structuralist perspective provides a valuable insight into what and who influences the post-merger IS integration
process and how the process is shaped (see Table 3 for a summary). But it does not explain in-depth why that
process was problematic and why and how it succeeded despite all problems. In the next part of our analysis,
therefore, we take a more detailed look at the role of the involved individual actors.
Table 3: The Structuralist Perspective
Elements

Characteristics

Acquisition context
Decision making
IS/business alignment
IS integration strategy
Organizational changes

•
•
•
•

Old and new information
systems

•
•
•
•
•
•

IS integration team

•
•
•

Management made initial decisions.
Management found P1’s processes
superior.
Requirements based on a need to
coordinate and control production better
Simultaneously changing business
environment
P1 needed a new IS, as continued use of
the old IS was not permitted.
P1 and PrintComp used IS tailored to
their needs.
None of the existing ISs had the
necessary properties.
The new IS was fitted to PrintComp’s
peculiarities.
The new IS was initially erroneous.
The user interface resembled
PrintComp’s old IS, its functionality P1’s
old IS.
Small IS integration project team
Steering committee dissolved quickly.
Functional groups dissolved early.

Influence on post-merger IS integration
process
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

•
•
•

Fully integrated system
Good IS/business alignment
P1 had a prominent role in the requirements
definition.
Vague requirements definitions and unstable
development
Refinement of some functions
The new system was developed first for P1
then extended to the whole company.
A tailored system was chosen.
Mixing components from each prior system
Users in P1 were dissatisfied with the degree
of user friendliness.
Users in P2–P5 were dissatisfied with the new
operations mode.
Users in all plants felt they had to use the
others’ IS.

Not enough resources for critical tasks
No strategic planning later in the project
The functional groups’ views were not
represented properly.

The Individualist Perspective
Viewing stakeholders as individuals, not as structural elements, uncovers the fact that top management did not show
particular commitment to or support for the IS integration project. They provided only very limited human resources
and no other support for the project team. The managers dissolved the steering group and left the project before the
IS was installed in plant P1. An internal user survey indicated that the users were actually unaware of any top
management involvement.
Emphasizing management decisions as elements of the structuralist perspective, our first focus is on the Chief
Financial officer (CFO), a member of top management and of the steering group, who played a significant role. He
had some experience from a smaller acquisition. He also had an overall strategic vision of the IS needed and a
positive attitude toward state-of-the-art IT. He communicated this attitude, which had positive effects on the IS
integration on company level and in several plants, removed the earlier “us and them” feeling, and pushed IS as an
enabler for the overall organizational integration. He also heavily influenced the decision to opt for a tailored solution,
but he did not possess any specific IS-planning skills.
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In contrast, the IS integration project manager (PM) and the newly appointed production manager―a key user, both
from acquired P1, did not have significant experience of large IS projects; nor did they have prior merger experience
or a clear vision of IS integration. The project manager alone had to lead the project. This led to inefficient
integration management, as well as scope and resource problems. This was especially true when the IS project was
extended from P1 to a new, integrated IS for all plants in the company. As P1―and consequently these two
managers―had a dominant role in the requirements definition process, their individual skills led to initially vague
requirements and equally vague IS functions.
The project manager’s decision to implement all modules simultaneously, and his over-optimism regarding the
quality of the first versions of software delivered, aggravated the problems. Due to the project manager’s estimation
errors, insufficient personnel were devoted to the project. Thus, the software could not be tested properly and the
schedules were delayed. This explains further why erroneous software was implemented. The vendor’s
development manager noted that this was also due to his own and his development team’s poor understanding of
PrintComp’s production process.
However, the IS integration project manager had great learning skills and started deploying more efficient
approaches. Together with the two project team members, he ensured that bugs were eventually fixed. After
implementing the new IS in plants P1–P4, he had gained enough experience and confidence to make the decision
that the implementation in P5 had to be postponed because modules critical for its operation were still unstable.
Communication had been planned to be open, but in practice it was not effective. Nobody had communicated the
importance of the project to the employees at the start, and there was very little two-way communication between
the project team and users. The project manager stated that he was initially too occupied with technical problems to
have time to inform the users of the project’s progress. The CFO preferred receiving information from the project
manager only and remained invisible to the rest of the integration team and users. Later, the project manager
improved his communication. He engaged in active two-way communication with the end-users and ensured that
they received help from the support staff in the project team. This was highly appreciated. Together with increasing
software quality, it supported the eventual acceptance of the system.
User resistance was an early reaction to the communication flaws, as the users received no response to their
concerns. They lacked an understanding of why it was important to key-in the information carefully and saw it as a
chore. They also felt that they did not have enough skills when the system went live and needed more training. The
end-users in all plants started to resist the new IS actively and complained; the pricing module simply was not used
at all. This situation eventually improved when the project manager offered information and assistance.
Table 4 provides a summary of how the individualist perspective sheds light on PrintComp’s post-acquisition IS
integration. Together with the structuralist perspective, it allows for a closer look into the interaction of these
individuals within the given structures. This process view is subject of the last part of our analysis.

The Interactive Process Perspective
In the interactive process perspective, we take as a starting point the content of change. The initial content of
change was to substitute P1’s prior owners’ IS with a new IS. The new IS was to combine P1’s business logic and
work processes with the other plants’ IS interface and control features. It would adjust P1 to the company’s mode of
control.
What emerged was a complex and evolutionary IS integration process, which was characterized by changing plans,
refinements of requirements, redevelopment of inappropriate software, and user frustration and resistance.
Ultimately, this resulted in fully integrated work processes and a tailored IS for the whole company, which realized
management’s objectives and was accepted by everyone in all plants.
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Table 4: The Individualist Perspective
Elements

Characteristics

Management
commitment
Prior post-acquisition IS
integration experience

 No commitment in general

Post-acquisition IS
integration skills

Communication
preferences

Resistance to change

 CFO had experience from smaller
acquisition, an overall strategic vision
of IS, and a positive attitude toward IT,
but no specific IS planning skills.
• Project manager and productions
manager had no post-merger IS
integration experience, no experience
from large IS projects, no prior IS
planning skills.
• Project manager had a personal
learning capability.
• Vendor’s project manager and
development had a poor
understanding of the needs of
PrintComp.
• CFO preferred communication with
project manager.
• Project manager had initially little no
time to communicate to users.
• Project manager and project staff
communicated help to users.

• Users lacked understanding of new IS
and skills for using it.

Influence on post-merger IS
integration process
• No support for the project team
• Insufficient human resources
• IS as enabler of the organizational
integration
• Purchase of a tailored IS
• Removal of “us and them” feelings
at management and company level
• Inefficient IS integration
management
• Inefficient requirements definition
• Lack of human resources
• Schedule delays
• Problems with IS quality

• Top management support invisible
to the project team and users
• Users became frustrated.
• Users lacked understanding of the
new IS.
• Support staff’s help was
appreciated.
• Increased acceptance of the system
• Opposition in the form of complaints
• Refusal to use one module

The social context and the social process in which the integration process took place points to the history, social
relations, and a political power constellation where the CFO favored a domestic vendor. The CFO had a longstanding business relationship with this vendor. He had power to make this choice, even though the vendor’s
development team did not have an understanding of the new production processes.
The social infrastructure and the social relations of the post-merger IS integration process were characterized by
new relationships and several pairs of antagonists. The new relationships were initially detached, distant, and
formal. The CFO and the project manager, the project team, the future users, the employees of plant P1, the
employees of the other plants, as well as the project team and the vendor, were antagonist pairs. The involved
parties did not know each other, and no mechanisms were in place to change this. From a historical perspective, the
different types of previous IS led to a situation where the integrated solution initially was disliked and opposed by all
employees, either for its features or its interface.
This led to frustrations and feelings of “us and them” frequently changing and refined requirements, as well as
demands to alter the IS under development. However, Social relationships developed over time. The project team,
which internally had good and close relations, started helping the users. The project team’s vendor relationship
improved through the introduction of a software tool for handling and monitoring change requests. This, in turn,
resulted in a better quality of the IS. These improvements compensated for a largely withdrawn top management.
Power issues impacted the social process. The CFO exerted power in regard to choosing a less competent vendor,
but also by promoting a well-aligned, tailored IS. The project manager had limited power with regard to getting
necessary resources, but also with regard to the vendor and users. This led to lengthy negotiations with the vendor
and user problems, such as frequent change requests and resistance. There was also an operational level power
struggle related to the naming of the production lots, as both merging sides preferred their own naming systems.
Eventually, a compromise was reached in a time-consuming process, in which a shared language and common
work processes were developed.
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This social process has to be seen in light of the general culture and political rivalry of the two cities in which the
plants are located. The competition is usually expressed through irony and mutual resentment. Doubts about the
new IS were also voiced this way.
These problems decreased as the software quality improved, errors were fixed, and the users learned to use the
system. A user survey in 2005 showed that the employees finally were satisfied with the new, integrated IS. By the
end of 2005, the new IS supported the integrated production, as well as allowing for better coordination and
reporting, and the IS integration project was closed. Table 5 comprises the main insights from the interactive
process perspective.
Table 5: The Interactive Process Perspective
Elements
Content of Change
New IS and work
processes

Social Context
History

Social
Infra-structure

Social Relations

Social Process
Politics

Culture

Characteristics

Influence on post-merger IS integration process

Planned:
• Transfer of work processes from
P1 to other plants before
implementation of new IS
• Development of an effective
production planning, coordination,
and control IS
• Initial plans to development a new
IS for P1 only
• New plan of development of a
common IS for the whole
company

Materialized:
• New IS used as a vehicle for implementing P1
processes in other plants and organizational
integration
• A tailored solution
• Project scope, budget and schedule extended
early to cover the whole company; P1 as pilot and
later for the other plants
• Opposition and frustration
• Initially erroneous software
• Redevelopment
• Realized management’s goals
• Eventually accepted by everyone

• Previous system purchased from
domestic vendor
• Different types of previous
systems
• Pairs of antagonists:
CFO and project manager,
project team and users,
P1 and other plants,
Project team and vendor
• Management (CFO) favored
known domestic vendor
• New and detached relationships
• Implementation of appropriate
tools to support communication
with vendor
• Withdrawn top management
• Close relation of project manager
and project team members; their
joint effort

• Selection of the same vendor
• Dislike and frustration

• CFO had power to opt for
domestic vendor
• Operational level power issues
during design of the IS
• Project manager had only limited
power

• Rivalry of the cities of plants’
locations; different systems,
processes and procedures

•
•
•
•

Communication problems
Tension and frustration
Frequent requirements changes
Tense negotiations with vendor

•
•
•
•
•

Selection of vendor and tailored IS
Distant and formal communication
Improved communication and relationship
No concrete management support
System acceptance

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Selection of vendor and tailored IS
Disagreement in design process
Time-consuming solution
Shared language and agreed work routines
Users’ refusal to use a system module
Frequent requirements changes
Tensions with vendor
Limited resources
Aggravated “us and them” attitudes
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In the following we summarize our findings and then discuss what could have been done to support the IS
integration process, which events could have been predicted and avoided, what was unpredictable and unavoidable,
and what had to be dealt with as it occurred.

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
To summarize, we revisit the preceding analysis and identify a number of inhibitors and facilitators of the IS
integration process at PrintComp. These help to understand the messiness and complexity, but also the ultimate
success of the IS integration in the case. The inhibitors led to the problems described in the previous sections. On
the other hand, the facilitators turned the problems into a successful IS integration. Table 6 summarizes the
inhibitors and facilitators.

IMPLICATIONS
The presented framework allows for gaining insight on issues that both inhibited and facilitated the post-merger IS
integration at PrintComp. While many of the inhibitors of PrintComp’s IS integration could have been predicted
based on prior literature, some were not known. In particular, the framework provides new insight into why, despite
all the problems, PrintComp eventually succeeded in its post-merger IS integration.
First, the structuralist, individualist, and interactive process perspectives of our framework guide the attention to
previously known inhibitors of success in both post-merger and more general IS implementation contexts. These
include technical problems (McKiernan and Merali 1995; Johnston and Yetton 1996; Stylianou et al. 1996),
executive heedlessness (Stylianou et al. 1996; Mehta and Hirschheim 2007, Yelassi and Dutta 1993),
communication problems (Robbins and Stylianou 1999), user resistance (Yelassi and Dutta 1993), and vendor’s
competence (Yelassi and Dutta 1993).
Second, the framework allows us to focus on previously known inhibitors of post-merger IS integration such as the
difficulties to blend together different IS components (Johnston and Yetton 1996; Mehta and Hirschheim 2007),
allocation of a suitable IS integration team (Yelassi and Dutta 1993; Brown et al. 2003), and power issues (Mehta
and Hirschheim 2007; Granlund 2003). The role of power difference between the acquirer and the acquired unit
noted in prior literature (Mehta and Hirschheim 2007) took the form of the project manager’s limited power, as he did
not have prior history with the parent company.
Table 6: Inhibitors and Facilitators of Post-merger IS Integration

Structualist
perspective

Individualist
perspective
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Inhibitors
• Decision to pursue integration without IS
• Decision to limit IS to one plant
• Decision to combine IS features
• Vague and changing requirements for the new
IS
• Errors and alterations in the new IS
• Small IS integration team
• Dissolution of steering committee and
functional groups
• Top management’s lack of commitment and
support
• CFO’s preference for limited communication
• PM’s lack of experience
• PM’s preference for limited and one-way
communication
• Users’ lack of skills and their resistance
• Vendor’s initial lack of competence in the
application area
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Facilitators
• Decision to use IS as integration
enabler
• Decision to pursue full IS integration
• Decision to tailor IS
• No updates for old IS available
• No permission to use plant P1’s IS

• CFO’s strategic vision
• CFO’s positive attitude
• PM’s growing IS integration
management skills
• PM’s changed preference for open
and two-way communication
• Project team members’ support for
users

Interactive
process
Perspective

•
•
•
•
•
•

Choice of initially less competent vendor
New, initially detached relationships
CFO’s power exertion with regard to vendor
choice
PM’s limited power
Power struggles among users
Cultural rivalry between towns

• Improved professional handling of
development and integration process
and change requests
• Developing relationships
• CFO’s power exertion with regard to
tailored IS
• Project team’s good internal
relationship
• Negotiations
• Improved exchange of information
• Development of shared language

Third, the framework allowed us to pay attention to some important, merger-specific inhibitors in this IS integration
endeavor. The organizational difficulties of integrating the merging companies’ IS components became apparent as
the company chose to blend best features of different productions in order to building a new integrated system. The
project manager’s unavoidable lack of experience with one of the organizations jeopardized integration. The existing
literature suggests that prior merger experience may facilitate the IS integration (Stylianou et al. 1996; McKiernan
and Merali 1995), but PrintComp did not have a history of similar IS integration. Thus, it was impossible to find an IS
manager with both integration experience and sufficient knowledge and experience from PrintComp.
The interactive process perspective of the framework was particularly useful in drawing out new, merger-related
insights into inhibitors of IS integration. The new, initially detached relationships, user-level power struggles over the
new IS, as well as cultural rivalry between the merging sites, clearly troubled the IS integration.
When discussing the inhibitors of post-merger IS integration, the framework’s merit is in integrating and organizing
existing knowledge on post-merger integration as well as discovering some new obstacles. Knowing that
PrintComp’s IS integration was disturbed by all these predictable and unpredictable issues, we need to know how it
eventually succeeded.
First, as reported in the literature, the integration was facilitated by strategic decisions, such as the decisions to use
IS as an enabler for change (McKiernan and Merali 1995), to pursue full IS integration (Robbins and Stylianou
1999), and to tailor the new IS to the company’s needs (Jelassi and Dutta 1993). Also, the CFO’s strategic vision
(Robbins and Stylianou 1999) and his positive attitude toward IT (Merali and McKiernan 1993) supported the IS
integration. Second, our findings emphasize that IS context matters (Walsham 1993), as these favorable decisions
were partly guided by the fact that no updates were available for the old IS.
Third, while the project manager’s good integration skills and preference for open communication (Robbins and
Stylianou 1999), as well as user support, and managing the vendor relationship professionally are not new
facilitators to the IS literature, the analysis of the PrintComp case showed how learning and evolution of these skills
and preferences supported IS integration.
Fourth, a well-functioning IS integration team facilitated integration (Brown et al. 2003; Jelassi and Dutta 1993). We
also identified the role of and power issues related to prominent individuals (Granlund 2003) as a facilitator. While
this was known from the IS literature and post-merger research in other areas such as Accounting, it had previously
not been found in post-merger IS integration.
Fifth, we identified new facilitators of post-merger IS integration. The merger context poses the challenge of two
previously unknown parties needing to collaborate. PrintComp succeeded in developing new relationships between
the managers of the two organizations, negotiating compromises in defining the new IS, improving the information
exchange, and developing a new, shared language. The known and new facilitators and inhibitors are summarized
in Table 7.
In sum, the framework shows its merit in identifying and integrating a number of facilitators and inhibitors of postmerger IS integration success. Many facilitators and inhibitors are new to the post-merger IS integration literature.
Some facilitators are known from the IS literature or other related research such as post-merger integration in
Accounting. Yet others are specific to IS issues in mergers and are new.
Many of the key inhibitors are relatively instantaneous or constant as well as avoidable. These inhibitors have mostly
been predicted by prior literature (cf. Table 7). Yet the post-merger IS integration is a special context, in the sense
that there are two previously separate entities that are blended together. This unavoidably leads to problems due to
lack of experience with and knowledge of the other party. Thus, an organization addressing post-merger IS
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integration will benefit from a thorough analysis of its particular merger context as well as the prior and new
information systems. This way, it will have a better understanding of how and why the context favors or constrains
certain decisions. To improve chances of success, organizations facing the challenges of post-merger IS integration
should ensure that the decision-makers have prior experience from such organizational transformations, enough
knowledge and good relationships with both merging organizations, as well as sufficient IS skills. It may be that to
bring all these skills together, more than one person is needed. In this case, a smooth and efficient collaboration
between the different sources of knowledge should be ensured. It may also be beneficial to improve the decision
makers’ and executers skills by, e.g., training, or bring in consultants or other forms of external expertise to fill in
possible gaps in IS integration knowledge.
This blending of two originally separate units is an evolutionary change process in nature, leading to inhibitors that
appear and whose nature changes over time. As a result, managers of post-merger IS integration will face obstacles
that are both unavoidable and unpredictable and should thus stay sensitive to such problems and be prepared to
respond to them throughout the project.
A key insight is that the post-merger IS integration experiences evolutionary paths are messy and surprising. Thus,
researchers and managers should be sensitive to the emerging pressures that shape the actual post-merger IS
integration and be ready to adapt their plans and actions accordingly.
Key components of the messiness and complexity of post-merger IS integration include some inhibitors that can be
avoided and others inhibitors that cannot be avoided; some inhibitors also evolve over time. Table 8 summarizes
these. For example, new, initially detached relationships are rooted in two previously separate organizations which
merged into one. Similarly, it is nearly impossible to find a project manager who would have prior experience from
both merging companies. Such inhibitors need to be recognized and proper risk management applied.
Our case study also illustrates how some inhibitors (see Table 8) covering much of the lifespan of post-merger IS
integration are long-lasting and evolve during the process. Consequently, the problems they caused appear at
different stages of the integration process and take different forms. For example, an IS integration team that has
sufficient personnel size and diversity of knowledge is needed, but it may be difficult to predict the size and
composition of such a team in advance. Therefore, management has to be prepared to add resources during the
integration. A final instance of such an evolutionary inhibitor is cultural clashes and power struggles. Their source
should be analyzed, and management should prepare for mitigating these problems to achieve successful postmerger IS integration.
Table 7: Known and New Facilitators and Inhibitors of Post-merger IS Integration

Findings known
from existing
literature
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Inhibitors
• Decision to pursue integration without IS
• Vague and changing requirements for the new IS
• Errors and alterations in the new IS
• Small IS integration team
• Dissolution of steering committee and functional
groups
• Top management’s lack of commitment and
support
• CFO’s preference of limited communication
• PM’s preference of limited and one-way
communication
• Users’ lack of skills and their resistance
• Vendor’s initial lack of competence in the
application area
• Choice of initially less-competent vendor
• CFO’s power exertion with regard to vendor
choice
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Facilitators
• Decision to use IS as integration
enabler
• Decision to pursue full IS
integration
• Decision to tailor IS
• CFO’s strategic vision
• CFO’s positive attitude
• Project team members’ support for
users
• CFO’s power exertion with regard
to tailored IS
• Project team’s good internal
relationship

New findings

Decision to combine IS features
PM’s (inevitable) lack of experience
New, initially detached relationships
PM’s limited power due to background in
acquired factory
• Power struggles among users
• Cultural rivalry between towns
•
•
•
•

• No updates for old IS available
• No permission to use plant P1’s IS
• PM’s growing IS integration
management skills
• Negotiations
• Evolution of:
 PM’s communication
preferences
 Professional handling of
development and integration
process and change requests
 Relationships
 Exchange of information
 Shared language

CONCLUSION
This longitudinal study provides insights into post-merger IS integration by examining it using an integrated
framework consisting of three perspectives: a structuralist, an individual, and an interactive process. Our empirical
analysis illustrates how all three perspectives contribute to an understanding of the shape which the actual postmerger IS integration process took and how it evolved. In our case, many inhibitors of success were predicted by the
existing literature. Yet the organization was eventually able to bring its post-acquisition IS integration project to a
successful end.
While the existing knowledge on IS implementation covers many important issues related to post-merger IS
integration, our results emphasize that, in addition to the existing knowledge, researchers and managers of postmerger IS integration should pay particular attention to the IS and organizational merger contexts; the need to build
relationships, communication, collaboration, and shared language between the merging parties; the possible surge
of more and more varied power struggles; and, most importantly, understanding and treating post-merger IS
integration as a complex, messy, and evolutionary process.
Table 8: Nature of Inhibitors of Post-merger IS Integration
Avoidable
Unavoidable
• Decision to pursue integration without IS
• PM’s lack of experience from both
organizations
• Decision to limit IS to one plant
• New, initially detached relationships
• Decision to combine IS features
• Dissolution of steering committee and functional groups
• Top management’s lack of commitment and support
• CFO’s preference of limited communication
• PM’s preference of limited and one-way communication
• Vendor’s initial lack of competence in the application area
• Choice of initially less-competent vendor
• CFO’s power exertion with regard to vendor choice
• PM’s limited power
Long-lasting and evolving inhibitors in PrintComp’s IS
integration:
• Vague requirements for the new IS
• Errors and alterations in the new IS

Long-lasting and evolving inhibitors in
PrintComp’s IS integration:
• Changing requirements for the new IS
• Small IS integration team
• Users’ lack of skills and their resistance
• Power struggles among users
• Cultural rivalry between towns

Our results also emphasize the importance of the various “soft” aspects at play. While the “hard” arguments related
to, e.g., monetary savings and other financial issues may be appealing to some stakeholders, such as shareholders,
our findings show that they alone are not sufficient to guide the decision making of a successful post-merger IS
integration. Instead, the decision makers have to consider the contributions of the social context and process to the
process and product of post-merger IS integration.
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The current case is an initial step toward improving the understanding of what shapes post-M&S IS integration and
how is it shaped. As such, its scope is limited and the case context impacted our findings. First, post-hoc interviews
always bear the risk of a recall bias that may have affected our findings. We sought to mitigate this risk by
comparing accounts among various interviewees and documents. Moreover, our period of data collection started
only after the first pilot implementation. To address these biases, future research should use observational methods
such as ethnographies and study the whole lifecycle of post-merger IS integration, starting from strategic planning.
Second, the case background was an acquisition with a clear power difference between the organizations. In
addition, the acquirer and the acquired are located in the same country, and no differences of national cultures were
at play. Focusing on other M&A contexts such as a merger of equals or inter-cultural integrations offer promising
avenues for research to adapt and extend these results.
Third, the particular content of change in this case was a full integration via blending together features of existing IS
to develop a new, ERP-style IS. Integrations of other IT artifacts, such as other types of software applications,
telecommunication networks, or IT architectures, are important topics for research, and so are other integration
strategies, such as taking over one party’s IS or building bridge-ware.
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APPENDIX A.

EXAMPLES OF INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

Semi-structured theme interviews were conducted. The interviews were conducted in the native language of the
interviewees. Among others, the interview themes included:
• Integration strategy
o What integration strategy was chosen? (Full consolidation/partial integration no integration/mixture?)
Details? Why?
o How were these decisions made? (Who, when, Why?)
• Executing the integration strategy:
o How was it executed? (When was it integrated, who managed the integration, all at once vs. phased,
how were the users taken into account, etc.? Why?)
o How were these decisions made? (Who made them, who participated, when, what changes occurred,
etc?)
o What has been difficult? What problems have been experienced? (How did you get over/cope with these
problems, why, etc.?)
o What opportunities appeared? (How were they exploited? Why? etc.)
• Success
o How would you define success in this IS integration? Why?
o To what extent were these success criteria reached? Why?
o How is this related to the overall integration success at the level of the whole organization? (Goals and
reaching them?)
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APPENDIX B.

THE LITERATURE SEARCH

In the first phase of our literature search, we included twelve reputed, high-quality journals as identified by, e.g.,
Mylonopoulos and Theoharakis 2001, and Vessey, Ramesh et al. 2002, and by the IS senior scholars
(http://home.aisnet.org/displaycommon.cfm?an=1&sub articlenbr=346): Information Systems Research (ISR),
Journal of Management Information Systems (JMIS), MIS Quarterly (MISQ); Communications of the ACM,
Information and Management, Management Science, Harvard Business Review, Decision Sciences, Decision
Support Systems, the European Journal of Information Systems (EJIS), Information Systems Journal, and the
Journal of the Association for Information Systems. In these journals, we searched for articles that contained the
words merger and acquisition, as they would also cover articles containing words such as mergers, acquisitions,
post-merger, and post-acquisition in the title, abstract, or full text. Error! Reference source not found. summarizes
the nine papers found and their findings.
To secure a broader basis for the theoretical background, we thereafter extended our search to other IS journals, in
particular with a strategic focus and to academic periodicals from IS reference disciplines as such organizational
science, finance, and accounting, and others. To ensure the high quality of the research results, we deliberately
excluded conferences, with the exception of the top IS conference, the International Conference on Information
Systems (ICIS), from our search. We also studied the reference lists of the articles found in the first search round,
and we used search engines and suggestions from colleagues. The nine articles found in this systematic search are
listed in Error! Reference source not found.. The main findings of these studies support those found earlier as a
result of the first phase of the literature review and are, therefore, not listed here individually.
Table 9: Key Findings on Post-merger IS Integration from Top IS Publications
Focus
Post-merger IS
planning

Method
Case
study

Role of IT fit in
merger

Case
study

IS integration
effectiveness
on mergers

Survey

Success
factors of postmerger IS
integration

Survey

Factors
influencing
strategic
decisionmaking for
post-merger IS
integration

Survey
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Key results
• Merger creates an opportunity for improving IS/business
alignment and managing IS through building partnerships with
top management.
• The match among the people, organization, IT infrastructure,
and the quality of information used to support operation is an
important factor in the decision for and evaluation of a merger.
• Exploiting IS integration synergies is affected by organizational
differences.
• Firms with high IS integration engagement out-perform those
without high engagement.
• Large cultural differences between organizations are negatively
associated with merger effectiveness.
Positive factors:
• Past integration experience
• High quality merger and IS integration planning
• Top management support
• High-quality end-user communication
• High level of end-user involvement in strategic IS integration
decision-making process
• Emphasis on IS standardization
Negative Factors:
• Large number of changes in IS policies and procedures
• Programming language incompatibilities
A mix of both technical and organizational factors:
• Management need relating to kind of business
• Simplicity of integration with regard to location (same country)
• IS architecture (centralized architecture)
• Integration of databases
• Achieving economies of scale

Article 2

Reference
Main and
Short 1989
Buck–Lew et
al. 1992
Weber and
Pliskin 1996

Stylianou et
al. 1996

Giacomazzi
et al. 1997

Antecedents
for effective
post-merger IS
integration

Survey

Knowledgesharing in
post-merger IS
integration

Case
study

Business/IS
alignment in
post-merger IS
integration

Case
study

Effect of postmerger IS
integration
capability on
merger
performance

Survey

Positive factors:
• Past integration experience
• High quality merger and IS integration planning
• Top management support
• High-quality end-user communication
• High level of end-user involvement in strategic IS integration
decision-making process
• Emphasis on IS standardization
• Mergers present a discontinuity in knowledge-sharing.
• Chosen strategies often mirror one of the merging companies
and match poorly with the post-merger needs.
• Lack of shared context, incompatibility of existing systems, tacit
knowledge and time pressures of merger contribute to
knowledge gap.
• Employees enact knowledge sharing practices significantly
different from official strategies.
• Firms are misaligned in the early post-merger period and come
to alignment a few years later.
• Business/IS alignment is a minor concern during pre-merger
and early post-merger phases.
• Business/IS alignment is a concern only in later post-merger
periods.
• Prior merger experience, overarching synergy goals, power
struggles, drive the initial IS integration decision making.
Acquirers with a higher post-merger IS integration capability obtain
higher post-merger performance.

Robbins and
Stylianou
1999

Yoo et al.
2007

Mehta and
Hirschheim
2007

Tanriverdi
and Uysal
2010

Table 10: Additional Literature Search Results: Post-merger IS Integration Literature
in Other IS-related Publications
Outlet
Journal of Strategic
Information Systems
Journal of Strategic
Information Systems
Long Range Planning
Journal of Strategic
Information Systems
Accounting, Auditing
& Accountability
Journal
Journal of Global
Information
Management
Journal of Strategic
Information Systems
Information Systems
Frontier
th

29 International
Conference on
Information Systems,
14–17.12.2008,
Paris, France

Reference
Jelassi and
Dutta 1993
Merali and
McKiernan 1993
McKiernan and
Merali 1995
Johnston and
Yetton 1996
Granlund 2003

Title
“Integrating global commercial operations with information
technology at BP Chemicals”
“The strategic positioning of information systems in post-acquisition
management”
“Integrating information systems after a merger”

Chin et al. 2004

“The impact of merger & acquisitions on IT governance structures:
A case study”

Wijnhoven et al.
2006
Alaranta and
Henningsson
2008
Vieru and Rivard
2008

“Post-merger IT integration strategies: An IT alignment perspective”

“Integrating information technology divisions in a bank merger fit,
compatibility and models of change”
“Management accounting system integration in corporate
mergers―A case study”

“An approach to analyzing and planning post-merger IS integration:
Insights from two field studies”
“The dilemma of integration versus autonomy: Knowledge-sharing
in post-merger IS development”
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APPENDIX C.

AN EXAMPLE OF CONSTANT COMPARISON

The following example from our analysis illustrates our approach and brings some transparency to our research
approach. The vendor’s project manager complained about the lack of sponsorship from PrintComp’s top
management and commented that “… the responsibility shifted to the end users … it must be the [PrintComp’s]
project team that bears the responsibility. This has been the problem here.” PrintComp’s end-user survey revealed
that management commitment was also invisible for the end-users and thus confirmed the vendor’s perception
concerning management support. In our interpretation, we further linked the end-user surveys and the IS vendor’s
statement to Print Comp’s integration project manager’s behavior. Without proper backing from management, the
project manager used the end-user surveys to champion his demands in negotiations with the vendor, in particular in
situations where he did not have enough power himself. That is, the project manager assigned significant
responsibility to the end-users. This kind of analysis and interpretation was carried out for each node and led to the
narrative account which forms the background for the sections on the “Case Setting” and “Analysis of the postacquisition IS integration process.”
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